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The state is an object of analysis that appears to exist 
simultaneously as material force and ideological construct, as 
something both real and illusory. This seemingly obvious yet 
paradoxical fact is the source of considerable theoretical 
difficulty. Not the least of these difficulties is that the network 
of institutional arrangement and political practice that forms the 
material substance of the state tends to be diffuse and ambiguously 
defined at its edges, whereas the public imagery of the state as an 
ideological construct tends towards coherence, unity and function. 
The scholarly analysis of the state is liable to reproduce in its 
own analytical tidiness this imaginary coherence, and misrepresent 
the incoherence of material practice. 
Drawing attention to this liability, Philip Abrams (1988) argues 
that we should distinguish sharply between two objects of analysis, 
the wstate-system" and the "state-idea." The first refers to the 
state as a system of institutionalized practice, the second to the 
reification of this system that takes on "an overt symbolic identity 
progressively divorced from practice as an illusory account of 
practice.I1. We should avoid mistaking the latter for the former, he 
suggests, by "attending to the senses in which the state does not 
exist rather than those in which it doesw (p. 82). 
This seems a sensible suggestion. But if the coherence and 
definition of the state indeed arise from the state-idea, then 
subtracting this from the state's existence as a system of power 
makes the limits of the system difficult to define. Foucault argues 
that the system of power extends well beyond state: "One cannot 
confine oneself to analyzing the State apparatus alone if one wants 
to grasp the mechanisms of power in their detail and complexity ...," he suggests. ##In reality, power in its exercise goes much 
further, passes through much finer channels, and is much more 
ambiguousw (1980a, 72). If so, how does one define the state 
apparatus (as even Foucault still implies one should) and locate its 
limits? At what point does power enter channels fine enough and its 
exercise become ambiguous enough that one recognizes the edge of 
this apparatus. Where is the exterior that enables one to identify 
it as an apparatus? 
The answers cannot be found, it is argued here, in trying to 
separate the material fo-rms of the state from the ideological, or 
the real from the illusory. The state-idea and the state-system are 
better seen as two aspects of the same process. More exactly, the 
phenomenon we name the state arises from techniques that enable 
mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, 
non-material form. Any attempt to distinguish the abstract or ideal 
appearance of the state from its material reality, in taking for 
granted this distinction, will fail to understand it. The task of a 
theory of the state is not to clarify such distinctions but to 
historicize them. 
This paper is in three parts. The first examines an earlier 
attempt to separate the material forms of the state system from its 
ideological forms, which dominated post-war U.S. social science. The 
second analyzes the more recent "return of the statew as a reaction 
to this earlier phase, reintroducing an ideological dimension as the 
core of the state phenomenon. The third part outlines an alternative 
approach. 
In the post-war period, there have been two distinct responses in 
mainstream American social science to the difficulty of relating 
practice and ideology in the concept of the state. The first was to 
abandon the state, as a concept too ideological and too narrow to be 
the basis for theoretical development, replacing it with the concept 
of political system. In rejecting the ideological, however, systems 
theorists found themselves with no way of defining the limits of the 
system. Their empiricism had promised precise definitions, but 
instead they were unable to draw any line distinguishing the 
political order from the. wider society in which it functioned. 
The second response, since the later 1970s, has been to "bring - 
the state back inn (Evans et al. 1985). This neo-institutionalist 
work has defined the state in a variety of ways, most of which take 
it to be not just distinguishable from society but partially or 
wholly autonomous from it. In order to re-establish the elusive line 
between the two, however, the literature has made the state/society 
distinction correspond to a distinction between subjective and 
objective, or ideal and real. It has done so by reducing the state 
to a subjective system of wdecision-making,w a narrow conception 
that fails to fit even the evidence that neo-institutional authors 
themselves present. 
An alternative approach, presented in the third part of this 
paper, begins with the assumption that the elusiveness of the 
boundary between state and society needs to be taken seriously,-not 
as a problem of conceptual precision but as a clue to the nature of 
the phenomenon. Rather than hoping we can find a definition that 
will fix the state-society boundary (as a preliminary to 
demonstrating how the object on one side of it influences or-is 
autonomous from what lies on the other), we need to examine the 
detailed political processes through which the uncertain yet 
powerful distinction between state and society is produced. 
The distinction must be taken not as the boundary between two 
discrete entities, it is argued, but as a line drawn internally, 
within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a 
social and political order is maintained. The ability to have an 
internal distinction appear as though.it were the external boundary 
,between separate objects is the distinctive technique of the modern 
political order. The technique must be examined from a historical 
perspective (something the neo-institutionalist literature fails to 
do), as the consequence of certain novel practices of the technical 
age. In particular, it can be traced to methods of organization, 
arrangement and control that operate within the social practices 
they govern, yet create the effect of an enduring structure 
apparently external to those practices. This approach to the state 
can account for the salience of the phenomenon, but avoids 
attributing to it the coherence, unity and absolute autonomy that 
result from existing theoretical approaches. The conclusion to the 
paper'summarizes its argument in the form of five propositions on 
the study of the state. 
1. Abandoning the State 
Advocates of the two successive approaches to the problem of the 
state have been unable to agree about the nature of the difference 
between them. The neo-institutionalists distinguish their work from 
the earlier political-systems literature by characterizing the 
latter as msociety-centeredll (Skocpol 1985, 4). Systems theorists 
have responded that their work did not locate explanations solely in 
society but examined a complex interaction between society and 
governmental institutions (Almond 1988, 853), and that the return of 
the state represents a regression I1to a conceptual morass from which 
we thought we had but recently escapedw (Easton 1981, 322). It would 
be clearer, I would argue, to read this debate among mainstream 
social scientists as two equally unsatisfactory responses to the 
problem of relating what they would call the subjective aspect of 
the state to the objective. 
'When American political science eliminated the term state from 
its.vocabulary in the 1950s, it was not on the grounds that the 
focus of political analysis should be moved from state to society 
''buts.that the word itself suffered from two related weaknesses: its 
ideological use as a political myth, as a "symbol for unity," 
produced disagreement about exactly what it referred to (Easton 
1953, 110-12); and even if agreement might be reached, these 
symbolic references of the term excluded significant aspects of the 
modern political process (pp. 106-15). These factors do not 
themselves account for the demise of the state concept, however, for 
its weaknesses and ambiguities had long been recognized (Sabine 
1934). What made the weaknesses suddenly fatal was the changed post- 
war relationship between American political science and American 
political power. This can be seen from re-reading what was written 
at the time, particularly in documents describing the llmissionll of 
the discipline. Post-war comparative politics, according to a 1944 
APSA report on the future of the field, would have to relinquish its 
narrow concern with the study of the state (Igthe descriptive 
analysis of foreign institutionsN) in order to become I1a conscious 
instrument of social engineeringg1 (Loewenstein 1944, 541). This 
intellectual machinery would be used for "imparting our experience 
to other nations and... integrating scientifically their 
institutions into a universal pattern of governmentw (p.547). To 
achieve these ends, the discipline had to expand its geographical 
and theoretical territory and become what the report called "a 
,total1 scienceg1 (p. 541). "We can no longer permit the existence of 
white spots on our map of the world,Ig the report said, employing 
metaphors reflecting the imperial climate of post-war American 
politics. "The frontier posts of comparative government must be 
moved boldlym (p. 543), both to encompass the globe and, by 
expanding into the territory of other disciplines (anthropology, 
psychology, economics and statistics), to open up each country to 
far more detailed methods of observation and questioning and thereby 
"gain access to the true Gestalt of foreign political  civilization^^^ 
(p. 541). 
Political Science had to expand its boundaries to match the 
growth of post-war American power, whose ambitions it would offer to 
serve. It is no coincidence that the particular theoretical 
territory into which post-war comparative politics first expanded 
was that most closely involved in colonial administration, the 
structural-functionalism of British social anthropology--where the 
argument for abandoning the state had already been made. The first 
llcontribution to the discipline of comparative politics,fI as it 
described itself, to propose abandoning the concept of the state and 
replacing it with that of political system was a pre-war work in 
social anthropology, African Political Systems by Fortes and Evans- 
Pritchard (1940, 1). The state as an entity separate from society 
Itdoes not exist in the phenomenal world," the authors claimed; "it 
is a fiction of the philosophersw (p. xxiii). Only the detailed 
study of the structures and functions of concrete political systems 
would uncover "the universal, essential characters which belong to 
all human societiesm and produce "a veritable science of human 
societyw (p. xi). Borrowing concepts and research methods from 
fields like anthropology, political science planned not simply to 
shift its concern from state to society but to open up the workings 
of the political process to far closer inspection. The field was to 
become a discipline of detail, pushing its investigation into the 
meticulous examination of the activities of political groups, the 
behavior of social actors, even the motivations of individual 
psyches. 
The opening of this new territory to scientific investigation 
seemed even more urgent by the 1950s, when post-war American 
optimism had turned into political uncertainty. It was what Easton 
(1953, 3) gravely called "our present social crisism--the launching 
of the Cold War and the accompanying domestic,struggle against 
subversion--that made suddenly imperative the elimination of 
ambiguity from political vocabulary and the construction of general 
social-scientific laws broad enough to include all significant 
political phenomena and I1pass beyond the experience ... of any one 
culturew (p. 319). 
The Research Strategy for Western Europe proposed in 1955 by the 
new Comparative Politics Committee of the Social Science Research 
Council, chaired by Gabriel Almond, criticized once again the "too 
great an emphasis on the formal aspects of institutions and 
processestw but now spoke of the need for a change in terms of 
"urgent and practical  consideration^.^^ In the major Western European 
countries, the committee reported, Itlarge bodies of opinion appear 
to be alienated from the West, politically apathetic, or actively 
recruited to Comm~nism.~~ The state was too narrow .and formal a focus 
for research, because "the basic problems of civic loyalty and 
political cohesion lie in large part outside of the formal 
government framework." Research was needed that would trace the 
degree of political cohesion and loyalty to the West beyond this 
formal framework, "into the networks of social groupings, and the 
attitudes of the general population." Such close examination could 
confirm the committee's expectation that, in cases such as France, 
l1there is at least the possibility of breaking the hold of the 
Communist party on a large part of its following" (Almond et al. 
1955, 1045). 
The sort of analysis now needed was illustrated the previous year 
with the publication of Almond's first major work in comparative 
politics, The Appeals of communism. This study of "the vulnerability 
of the free world to Communist penetrationI1 (for which it 
recommended the remedy of using organizations like the AFL-CIO to 
finance the creation of pro-American labor movements in Western 
Europe) was based on a survey questionnaire administered to 221 
former members of American and West European communist parties, and 
on thirty-five "clinical case histories of Communistsw supplied to 
Almond by psychoanalysts who had American former communists as 
patients (Almond 1954, ix, xiv). Abandoning the state, political 
science could now penetrate even the psychiatrist's office in the 
search for political explanation. 
The scientific tone of this literature seemed to offer the 
empiricism of political science a solution to the state and its 
ideological connotations. Yet abandoning the ideological unity of 
the state created a science whose object, the political system, had 
no discernible limit. The ever expanding empirical and theoretical 
knowledge that would have to be mastered by the future scientist of 
comparative politics, Almond warned in 1960, I1staggers the 
imagination and lames the will." Despite the initial tendency "to 
blink and withdraw in pain," he wrote, there could be no hesitation 
in the effort to accumulate the knowledge that will Itenable us to 
take our place in the order of the sciences with the dignity which 
is~reserved for those who follow a calling without limit or 
conditionw (Almond 1960, 64). 
Advocates of the shift from the formal study of the state to the 
meticulous examination of political systems realized that they were 
embarking on a scientific enterprise "without limit." They assumed, 
however, that the very notion of system would somehow solve the 
question of boundaries. "Once we begin to speak of political life as 
a system of activity, wrote Easton, 
certain consequences follow...The very idea of a system 
suggests that we can separate political life from the rest of 
social activity, at least for analytical purposes, and examine 
it as though for the moment it were a self-contained entity 
surrounded by, but clearly distinguishable from, the 
environment or setting in which it operates (1957, 384). 
Easton's language here already indicates the problems. Like the 
theory of the state, systems theory depends on the political being 
clearly distinguishable from its social "environment." Rather than 
an actual distinction, however, we are told that it is only l1as 
thoughaa the distinction exists, "for the moment," and merely as a 
consequence of speaking of politics as a system. The basic tenet of 
systems theory, that the political realm is discrete and thus 
identifiable as a system, reflects a temporary phenomenon arising 
only from nthe very idea of a system. 
The question of boundaries created even more difficulties for 
Almond. The concept of political system, he said, was intended to 
"separate out analytically the structures that perform political 
functions in all societies," and therefore implied the Iaexistence of 
boundariesw--the points "where other systems end and the political 
system begins." The boundary required a I1sharp definition," 
otherwise Iawe will find ourselves including in the political system 
churches, economies, schools, kinship and lineage groups, age-sets, 
and the likeaa (1960, 5, 7-8). Yet this is precisely what happened. 
The edge of the system turned out to consist not of a single, sharp 
line but of numerous, shifting associations that "man the boundaries 
of the political systemw (p.9). These alinterest-articulationw 
structures, as Almond called them, were virtually limitless, for 
they were said to include every conceivable form of collective 
expression of demand, from winstitutionalw groups such as 
legislatures, churches and armies, to wassociatedm groups such as 
labor or business organizations, wnon-associatedm groups such as 
kinship or ethnic communities, and "anomicW groups such as 
spontaneous riots and demonstrations (p.33). 
In attempting to eliminate the ambiguity of a concept whose 
ideological functions prevented conceptual precision, the systems 
approach substituted an object whose very boundary unfolded into a 
limitless and undetermined terrain. 
2. The Return of the State 
Even if the boundaries of the political system proved as ambiguous 
as those of the state, the latter concept suffered from one more 
weakness in the opinion of systems theorists. The state seemed to 
Easton (1953, 111-12) Ialess an analytic tool than a symbol for 
unity, ... a myth." It represented something ntranscendental" that 
msymbolizes the inescapable unity of one people on one soil." The 
imprecision that made the term unsuitable as an analytic tool was 
the source of its political strength as a mythic or ideological 
construct. 
Yet for this very reason, despite its unsuitability for 
constructing a universal science of politics, the concept of the 
state refused to disappear. By 1968, J.P. Nettl was remarking that 
although the concept was out of fashion in the social sciences, lait 
retains a skeletal, ghostly existencetaa which "no amount of 
conceptual~restructuring can dissolve" (Nettl 1968, 559). The state, 
he wrote, is "essentially a sociocultural phenomenon," which occurs 
due to the "cultural dispositionw among a population to recognize 
what he called the state's aaconceptual existencen (pp. 565-6). 
Notions of the state "become incorporated in the thinking and 
actions of individual citizensw (p.577), he argued, and the extent 
of this conceptual variable could be shown to correspond to 
important empirical differences between societies, such as 
differences in legal structure or party system (pp. 579-92). 
Clearly the importance of the state as a common ideological and 
cultural construct should be grounds not for dismissing the 
phenomenon but for taking it seriously. Yet Nettl's understanding of 
this construct as a subjective disposition that could be correlated 
with more objective phenomena remained thoroughly empiricist. A 
construct like the state occurs not merely as a subjective belief, 
but as a representation reproduced in visible, everyday forms, such 
as the language of legal practice, the architecture of public 
buildings, the wearing of military~uniforms, or the marking out and 
policing of frontiers. The ideological forms of the state are an 
empirical phenomenon, as solid and discernible as a legal structure 
or a party system. Or rather, as this paper argues, the distinction 
made between a conceptual realm and an empirical one needs to be 
placed in question if one is to understand the nature of a 
phenomenon like the state. 
Such questions have not been raised. In fact the 
conceptual/empirical distinction has become the unexamined basis of 
a new literature. A decade after the publication of Nettlfs article, 
the state re-emerged as a central analytic concern of social and 
political science. "The lines between state and society have become 
, blurred," warned Stephen Krasne.rls Defending the National Interest 
(1978, xi), one of the early contributions to this re-emergence. 
"The basic analytic assumptionw of the neo-institutionalist approach 
it advocated, "is that there is a distinction between state and 
societyw (p.5). The new literature has presented this fundamental 
but problematic distinction, as in Nettlts article, in terms of an 
underlying distinction between a conceptual realm (the state) and an 
empirical realm (society). Such an approach appears to overcome the 
problem the systems theorists complained about and re-encountered, 
of how to discern the boundary between state and society: it will be 
assimilated to the apparently obvious distinction between conceptual 
and empirical, between a subjective order and an objective one. As 
we will see, however, this depends on both an enormous narrowing of 
the phenomenon of the state and an uncritical acceptance of this 
distinction. 
Neo-institutional approaches to political explanation present the 
state as an autonomous entity whose actions are not reducible to or 
determined by forces in society. This approach requires not so much 
a shift in focus, from society back to the state, but some way of 
re-establishing a clear boundary between the two. How are the porous 
edges where official practice mixes with the semi-official and the 
latter with the unofficial to be turned into lines of separation, so 
that the state can stand apart as a discrete, self-directing object? 
The customary Weberian definition of the state, as an organization 
that claims a monopoly within a fixed territory over the legitimate 
use of violence, is only a residual characterization. It does not 
tell us how the actual contours of this amorphous organization are 
to be drawn. 
The new theorists of the state have not filled in the 
organizational contours. They have retreated to narrower 
definitions, which typically grasp the state as a system of 
lldecision-making.ll The narrower focus locates the essence of the 
state not in the monopolistic organization of coercion, nor, for 
example, in the structures of a legal order, or in the mechanisms by 
which social interests find political representation, or in the 
arrangements that maintain a given relationship between the 
producers of capital and its owners, but in the formation and 
expression of authoritative intentions. Construed as a machinery of 
intentions--usually termed mrule-making,ll wdecision-making,ll or 
llpolicy-makingll--the state becomes essentially a subjective realm of 
plans, programs or ideas. This subjective construction maps the 
problematic state/society distinction on to the seemingly more 
obvious distinctions we make between the subjective and the 
objective, between the ideological and the material, or even between 
meaning and reality. The state appears to stand apart from society 
in the unproblematic way in which intentions or ideas are thought to 
stand apart from the external world to which they refer. 
Krasner: Beginning at the Subjective Level 
The logic of the neo-institutional approach can be illustrated from 
the writings of almost any of its major advocates. Two examples will 
be discussed here, the work of Stephen Krasner and Theda Skocpol. 
Krasner (1978) starts from the premise that the state should be 
understood essentially as a subjective process of policy-making. His 
study of the relationship between corporate overseas investment in 
raw materials and U.S. foreign policy "is premised on the 
intellectual vision that sees the state autonomously formulating 
goals that it then attempts to implement against resistance from 
international and domestic actorsu (p.10). This autonomous state is 
narrowly construed, for its meaning is limited principally to just 
two executive offices, the Presidency and the Department of State, 
which are said to enjoy a nhigh degree of insulation from specific 
societal pressuresI1 (p.11). Krasner considers the possibility that 
other offices, such as the Pentagon, the Treasury, the Commerce 
Department or the CIA, might "be thought of as part of the state," 
but decides to discount them on the grounds that "their behavior has 
varied. At some times they have acted to promote collective goals, 
at others to further specific societal and bureaucratic interestsw 
(p.11). Thus the author sustains his "intellectual visionw of the 
state as an autonomous promoter of collective goals by excluding 
from consideration state organs that sometimes fail to live up to 
this vision. 
The book analyzes U.S. government policy towards the control of 
foreign raw materials by American multinational corporations. It 
seeks to show that the state is autonomous from these "societalw 
interests, by proving that U.S. policy has been shaped by neither 
strategic nor economic interests (which would indicate some degree 
of corporate influence) but by a consistent "ideology." 
Strategic interests are eliminated as an explanation for foreign 
raw materials policy by simply defining nstrategicll to mean only 
cases where the territorial or political integrity of the U.S. is 
directly threatened (pp. 313-14). Under this definition, American 
efforts to protect oil interests in the Persian Gulf, for example, 
are said not to have been strategically motivated, because the 
physical survival of the United States or its political system was 
not at stake. 
Economic interests are eliminated as an explanation largely on 
the ground that an explanation in economic terms "does not account 
for the relatively passive American response to the dangers posed by 
economic nationalismw (p. 316). Krasner8s most important evidence 
for this alleged passivity is the American reaction to Muhammed 
MusaddeqDs nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 
1951-53. Leaving aside the fact that its victim was a British not an 
American corporation, this case offersno support for the author's 
thesis. It is true that the United States was initially less hostile 
than Great Britain towards a conservative Middle Eastern nationalist 
like Musaddeq, especially in a case where no American assets were 
affected and where support for such nationalism enabled the U.S to 
chdllenge Britain's dominant position in the region. Yet the passive 
American response consisted of first helping to enforce the British- 
led embargo on Iranian oil and then, when the resulting collapse of 
IranDs economy failed to change Musaddeq8s policies and radicalized 
his support, organizing a coup to remove the elected government and 
restore the authoritarian power of the Shah (Gasiorowski 1987). 
Krasner bases his argument that American policy "cannot easily be 
explained in terms of corporate interestsm on the fact that the U.S. 
dia' not initially pressure Musaddeq to allow U.S. multinationals 
access to Iranian oil (p. 127). But the interests of the oil 
companies did not lie in acquiring access to Iranian oil. They lay 
first in preventing the Iranians from marketing their oil themselves 
through independent dealers, which would break the oil,majorst 
monopoly of the world market and the illegal system of price-fixing 
dependent on it, and second in halting the U.S. Justice Department's 
criminal investigation of this price-fixing system. The U.S. 
government complied with both these wishes--and as a bonus forced 
the Iranians to let American companies share in the control of their 
oil. (The two architects of this policy, Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles and CIA director Allen Dulles, were both former 
partners in Sullivan & Cromwell, the law firm that represented the 
oil majors in the Justice Department's anti-trust case [Kwitny 1984, 
1633. ) 
Having appeared to refute economic and strategic explanations for 
U.S. policy towards foreign raw materials investments, Krasner 
presents the case for ideology as the explanatory motive. His 
decisive evidence here does not consist of any of the raw materials 
cases analyzed in the book, but rather the Vietnam war. He does not 
argue that AmericaOs ideological justifications for the war-against 
Vietnam were logical or consistent. In fact he admits that there was 
no "clear definition of American goalsn (p.322) and that the 
rationales that the government gave for the war "just do not make 
sensew (p.321). This might suggest that ideological justifications 
were adapted according to political need, or reflected conflicts 
within the administration, or were simply a confused attempt to 
defend a war in which even those responsible no longer believed. 
Krasner considers none of these possibilities, but declares instead . 
that lack of consistency and rationality are the nhallmark of an 
ideological foreign policy." 
The possibility that economic interests might have played some 
role alongside ideological motives in prolonging the war, given the 
large profits of arms corporations, is dismissed with the remark 
that it would have been easier to sustain high military spending "by 
picturing the Soviet Union and China as implacable enemies than by 
engaging in a land war in Southeast Asiaw (p.324). Even if one were 
to agree with this unproven claim it would not demonstrate that 
corporate interests played no role in sustaining the war; yet the 
book's entire argument for state autonomy rests on this single 
assertion. 
In neo-institutional political science, the alleged autonomy of 
the state is in large part produced definitionally. The amorphous 
object of analysis is reduced to something called wpolicy,~~ meaning 
the intentions and desires of certain state officials. The state 
becomes this disembodied ideality, which is characterized in terms 
like the "national interestw and examined not as a rhetorical effect 
but as a self-generated and governing idealism. 
Skocpol: The State as an "Actual Organizationm 
The contributions of historical sociologists like Theda Skocpol to 
neo-institutionalist theory appear to offer something very different 
from the work of political scientists like Krasner. SkocpolOs work 
on the politics of the New Deal and her earlier comparative study of 
social revolutions are based on detailed readings of carefully 
~0nStNcted case studies. Moreover, she explicitly rejects a 
1*voluntarist88 approach to the study of the state. States and Social 
Revolutions (1979), the work on which I will focus, argues that 
neither the occurrence nor the outcome of major social revolutions 
can be explained by the ideological visions of revolutionary or 
state leaders (pp.169-70). The book proposes instead a t@structuralw 
or "organizationalw approach to the state, in which revolutionary 
collapse and the building of new states are explained neither by 
societal factors alone nor by the subjective intentions of political 
actors, but by the structural vulnerabilities and potentials of 
states themselves. 
Despite these differences, however, it can be shown that, like 
other neo-institutionalist approaches, Skocpol's argument remains a 
voluntarist, ideological explanation. Once again, the clear boundary 
between state and society, on which the argument for autonomy 
depends, relies on an essential subjectivity as the basis of the 
state's distinctiveness. Skocpol later moves beyond this 
subjectivity. But as soon as she does, the boundary of the state-- 
and the evidence for state autonomy--disappears. 
Skocpolls explanation of the French, Russian and Chinese 
revolutions focuses on the collapse of autonomous states, whose 
autonomy is to be demonstrated by showing that the collapse comes as 
a consequence of the state's own flawed policies and institutional 
ties with society rather than any larger conflict between dominant 
social classes (p. 48). As with other neo-institutionalist 
theorists, the first step in the argument is to narrow the 
definition of the state to ensure that apparatuses into which %on- 
statew elements may penetrate are excluded. To this end, Skocpol 
distinuuishes "fundamentalVV state orsanizations from the broader 
VVpolit~cal system. IV I1The state prope;ly conceived, she writes, 
consists of "a set of administrative, policing, and military 
organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an 
executive authority." Such organizations represent only a part of 
VVoverall political systemstV1 which may also include VVinstitutions 
through which social interests are represented in state policymaking 
as well as institutions through which non-state actors are mobilized 
to participate in policy implementationu (p. 29). This distinction 
between the "state properly conceivedw and the VVpolitical systemn is 
clearly vital to the argument for state autonomy, yet it is made 
only in passing and we are given no actual means of knowing whether 
a given institution belongs merely to the political system or to the 
"state proper." In practice the difficulty is overcome by 
substituting for the latter phrase even narrower terms, in most 
cases simply Itthe monarchy. 
Having narrowed the meaning of the state, the next stage in the 
explanation is to present an interest or policy of the state that 
brings on the revolutionary crisis. In all three pre-revolutionary 
societies, Skocpol argues, "monarchs were interested in 
appropriating increased resources from society and channeling them 
efficiently into military aggrandizement or state-sponsored and 
centrally controlled economic developmentw (p. 49). As in Krasner, 
this interest of the state is to be the basis of its autonomy. The 
interest in military aggrandizement and economic development must be 
construed not in relation to any broader commercial or political 
interests, but as the state's independent desire. 
In France, for example, revolutionary collapse was brought on by 
the state's costly involvement in foreign wars, as it competed for 
markets, trade routes and colonies. Skocpol explains this 
involvement in ideological terms, as something "necessary for the 
vindication of French honor on the international scene," adding, 
almost as an afterthought, "not to mention the protection of 
seaborne commercew (p. 60). France is called a "commercial power," 
but we are told nothing about the extent or nature of this commerce 
or the broader kinds of political or economic interests involved 
(the trading companies, the commodities traded and their producers, 
the industries served, the role of finance houses, of the shipping 
industry, or of colonization corporations). The possibility that 
interests of this sort might be at least as significant a factor in 
state policy as the ideology of French honor is dismissed, it seems, 
for on the following page the state's involvement in "protracted and 
repeated general warfarett is attributed simply to the monarchy's 
unwillingness to abandon its "martial  ambition^,^^ and three pages 
later we are told that what "carried the eighteenth-century Bourbon 
monarchy into an acute financial crisistt was ''its unquenchable 
penchant for wartt (pp. 61-64). The initial crisis of the state is 
reduced to a question of ideology--an interest in "the vindication 
of French honor, the pursuit of "martial ambitions, @* or an 
unexplained l9penchant for war." A seemingly self-formed monarchical 
or national interest becomes the irreducible element in the 
explanation of state behavior. 
This narrow, subjectivist image of the state, however, is 
contradicted in Skocpol's case by her own further explanation of 
revolution. In responding to the crisis brought on by defeats in war 
or other external threats, she explains, the state is constrained by 
its "institutional relationshipsw with the landed upper classes. 
Skocpol provides very detailed accounts of these relationships for 
each of her case studies, from which it becomes clear that the pre- 
revolutionary state is something much larger and more amorphous than 
a monarch. Although the ltorganizationalw approach to the state 
insists that states are "actual organizationsm8 whose boundaries are 
distinct from society (p. 31), Skocpo18s illuminating account of 
these organizations in France, Russia and China shows that the 
boundaries are in practice impossible to draw. In all three cases, 
the provincial and local power of the state is inseparable from the 
political power of the landed classes. 
In France the state structure is described not as an actual 
organization but as an nextraordinary complex ... and multiply 
layeredw network of seigneurial domains, municipal corporations, 
provincial assemblies, and parlements, maintained through the system 
of venality of office whereby revenues are raised from the sale of 
state offices, which become individual possessions to be rented, re- 
sold or bequeathed (pp. 52-3). Russia and China present analogous 
pictures,. but in the latter case Skocpol drops the increasingly 
awkward distinction between state and society and introduces the 
more fluid metaphor of "two 8worlds8,w an agrarian economy and 
society and an apparatus of imperial administration. The 
interpenetration of the two worlds was so extensive, we are told, 
that the separation between them exists only for analytic purposes 
(p. 68). The separate existence of the state as an actual 
organization thus disappears altogether. Skocpol eventually 
acknowledges the impossibility of distinguishing state and society 
by bringing the two terms together in a single phrase and referring 
to the three countries as 1t8statist8 societiesm1 (p. 167). 
Similar problems arise in the second half of States and Social 
Revolutions, where the analysis moves from the causes of 
revolutionary collapse to the subsequent emergence of strong 
centralizing states. Once again these developments are not to be 
explained in terms of broader socio-economic transformations. If 
anything, "to a significant degree it is the other way around: the 
changes in state structures that occur during social revolutions 
typically both consolidate, and themselves entail, socioeconomic 
changesn (p. 164). In France, for example, the revolution 
represented a social and economic transformation nonlytt in that 
capitalist marketing and property relations came to prevail (p. 
179), and these changes are said to have been largely caused by the 
more far-reaching changes in the structure of the French state 
(p. 164) . 
If the transformation of the state is not to be attributed to 
social and economic factors 880utsidett he state, how is the 
emergence of a strong state after the revolution to be explained? 
Once again, the only means of isolating an institutional explanation 
is to fall back on ideology. The particular content of a 
revolutionary ideology does not explain the revolution's outcome, 
Skocpol argues, but in all three cases the leaders of the new state 
were men already "oriented tow the process of state building. This 
common orientation came from growing up in pre-revolutionary 
societies in which state employment was the most common path to 
prosperity, and had been reinforced by the external threats their 
countries faced from more advanced capitalist powers, to which 
active state intervention seemed the only adequate response (p. 
167). The explanation locates the cause of state actions, indeed the 
very origin of modern, centralized states, within the intentions of 
state officials, 
On close inspection, however, even this subjectivist explanation 
of the emergence of strong states ultimately fails to shift the 
locus of causation from society to state. The reasons we are given 
for the leaders1 subjective orientation to state building are 
thoroughly social and economic. They relate to particular pre- 
revolutionary societies in which private wealth was accumulated 
through a market in public offices, and in which local capitalist 
development lagged behind the spread of capitalist relations in 
ad j acent countries. 
Moreover, Skocpolfs comparison.of how strong states actually 
emerged in post-revolutionary France, Russia and China reintroduces 
all the broader social and economic factors that the discussion of 
leaders' subjective orientations is intended to reduce in 
significance or exclude. In the French Revolution, for example, she 
claims that the emergence of centralized state power was not 
something the dominant economic classes desired, and was the result 
less of class interests than "the exigencies of waging wars and 
coping with their domestic political repercussionsw (p. 178). Yet 
the fact that an outcome may not have been desired by any one party 
to a social conflict does not mean it cannot be understood as 
fundamentally a product of that conflict. Besides, Skocpol goes on 
to acknowledge that constructing a strong state was not just an 
exigency of war, but a major reason for embarking on militarist 
policies in the first place (pp. 116, 189, 195). In the Russian case 
she demonstrates a similar process, in which major turns in the 
development of the Soviet state are explained by reference to socio- 
economic relations in the country and the bases of support for the 
regime (pp. 217-225). Yet Skocpol concludes that the nshapew of the 
Soviet state was determined not by such economic and social factors 
but by how the I1leadership exercised and deployed state power in 
Russian societym (p. 220) . 
The Unity of the State 
The arguments advanced by Krasner and Skocpol in favor of a neo- 
institutional approach to political analysis face a common problem 
and respond in a similar way. The problem, as they both more or less 
admit, is that the edges of the state are uncertain, social forces 
seem to penetrate it on all sides, and the boundary between state 
and society as a result is very hard to determine. They respond by 
giving the state a narrow definition, personified as a policy-making 
actor. Like personhood, statehood is conceived in fundamentally 
idealist terms. The state stands apart from society as a set of 
original intentions or preferences, just as persons are thought of 
as units of autonomous consciousness and desire distinct from their 
material or social world. However uncertain its edges, the state, 
like the person, is an essential unity. 
This image of unity is preserved even in analyses that introduce 
the element of conflict between different parts of the state 
apparatus. Such conflict is an important indication of the 
permeability of state boundaries because it enables one to trace the 
way wider social differences reproduce themselves within the 
processes of the state. But in the neo-institutionalist literature 
such wider connections are not examined. The essential unity of the 
state is taken as given, and conflicts are treated as secondary 
phenomena internal to this larger unity. Indeed the impact of such 
internal conflicts on policy making is turned into part of the 
evidence for the state's independence from society. 
In her work on the New Deal, for example, Skocpol argues that 
state and party organizations should be treated as Itindependent 
determinantsw of political outcomes (1981, 156), for they have 
"their own structures and histories, which in turn have their own 
impact upon societyw (p. 200). Her argument is based on the failure 
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and liberal Democrats during the 
reformist phase of the New Deal (1935-38) to transform the federal 
government into a fully interventionist, social-democratic state 
(pp. 191-99). The principal reason for this failure was that popular 
support for FDRts reform program was not reflected in Congress, 
where conservative interests were powerfully entrenched. This 
entrenchment was due to the influence of southern Democrats 
(reflecting, of course, political and economic arrangements in the 
South that excluded Blacks from participation) and in general to the 
local control of congressional elections by "machines or special 
agglomerations of organized interestsw (p. 195). The conservatives 
in Congress blocked spending on social programs for the poor, and 
led the opposition to administrative reforms for fear that they 
"would disrupt existing symbiotic relationships among Congress, 
bureaucrats, and organized interest groups in the society at large1# 
(p. 194). Despite the election of a president with a program of 
popular reform, the power of conservative and other "organizedw 
interests in society was sufficiently represented within the state 
to derail the reforms. Skocpol interprets this as evidence for the 
argument that state institutions are essentially independent 
determinants of political outcomes. In fact the case offers an 
excellent example of how conflicts within the state reflect the 
penetration of wider social forces. 
3. An Alternative Approach 
The neo-institutionalist literature begins from the assumption that 
the state is a distinct entity, opposed to and set apart from a 
larger entity called society. Arguments are confined to assessing 
the degree of independence one object enjoys from the other. Yet we 
have seen that in fact the line between the two is often uncertain. 
Like the systems theorists before them, the neo-institutionalists 
have been unable to fix the elusive boundary between the political 
system or state and society. An alternative approach to the state 
has. to begin with this uncertain boundary. In a given area of 
practice, how is the effect created that certain aspects of what 
occurs pertain to society; while others stand apart as the state? 
More importantly, what is the significance of effecting this 
distinction? 
To introduce such an alternative approach, one can begin with a 
case discussed in Stephen Krasnerts study of U.S. foreign policy: 
the--relationship between the U.S. Government and the Arabian- 
American Oil Company (Aramco), the consortium of major U.S. oil 
corporations that possessed exclusive rights to Saudi Arabian oil 
(Krasner 1978, 205-12). The case illustrates both the permeability 
of the state/society boundary and the political significance.of 
maintaining it. After World War 11, the Saudis demanded that their 
royalty payment 'from Aramco be increased from 12% to 50% of profits. 
Unwilling either to cut its profits or to raise the price of oil, 
Aramco arranged for the increase in royalty to be paid not by the 
company but in effect by U.S. taxpayers. The Department of State, 
anxious to subsidize the pro-American Saudi monarchy, helped arrange 
for Aramco to take advantage of a loophole. in U.S. tax law, whereby 
the royalty was treated as though it were a direct foreign tax, to 
be paid not from the company's profits but from the taxes it owed to 
the U.S. Treasury (Anderson 1981, 179-197). This collusion between 
government and oil companies, obliging U.S. citizens to contribute. 
unawares to the treasury of a repressive Middle Eastern monarchy and 
the bank balances of some of the worldts largest and most profitable 
multinational corporations, does not offer much support for the 
image of a neat distinction between state and society. 
Krasner copes with this complexity by arguing that the oil 
companies were "an institutional mechanism1@ used by central 
decision-makers to achieve certain foreign policy goals, in this 
case the secret subsidizing of a conservative Arab regime. Policies \ 
that might be opposed by Congress or foreign allies could be pursued 
through such mechanisms, @@in part because private firms were outside 
of the formal political system1@ (pp. 212-3). This explanation offers 
only one side of the picture: the firms themselves also used the 
U.S. government to further corporate goals, as the Aramco case 
illustrates and as several studies of the oil industry have 
demonstrated in detail (Anderson 1981, Blair 1976, Miller 1980).Yet 
despite its failure to portray the complexity of such state/society 
relations, Krasner8s explanation does inadvertently point to what is 
crucial about them. The Aramco case illustrates how the 
"institutional mechanisms~ of a modern political order are never 
confined within the limits of what is called the state (or in this 
case, curiously enough, the "formal political system1@). This is not 
to say simply that the state is something surrounded by para-statal 
or corporatist institutions, which buttress and extend its 
authority. It is to argue that the boundary of the state (or 
political system) never marks real exterior, The line between 
state and society is not the perimeter of an intrinsic entity; which 
can be thought of as a free-standing object or actor. It is a line 
drawn internally, within the network of institutional mechanisms 
through which a certain social and political order is maintained. 
The point that the state's boundary never marks a real exterior 
can suggest why it seems so often elusive and unstable, But this 
does not mean the line is illusory, On the contrary, as the Aramco 
case shows, producing and maintaining the distinction between state 
and society is itself a mechanism that generates resources of power. 
The fact that Aramco can be said to lie outside the @'formal 
political system," thereby disguising its role in international 
politics, is essential to its strength as part of a larger political 
order. 
Many similar examples could be explored, such as the relationship 
between state and "privatew institutions in the financial sector, in 
schooling and scientific research, or in health care and medical 
practice. In each case it could be shown that the state/society 
divide is not a simple border between two free-standing objects or 
domains, but a complex distinction internal to these realms of 
practice. Take the example of banking: the relations between major 
corporate banking groups, semi-public central banks or reserve 
systems, government treasuries, deposit insurance agencies and 
export-import banks (which subsidize up to 40% of exports of 
industrialized nations), and multinational bodies such as the World 
Bank (whose head is appointed by the President of the United States) 
represent interlocking networks of financial power and regulation. 
No simple line could divide this network into a private realm and a 
public one, or into state and society. At the same time, banks are 
set up and present themselves as private institutions clearly 
separate from the state. The appearance that state and society are 
separate things is part of the way a given financial and economic 
order is maintained. This is equally true of the wider social and 
political order. The power to regulate and control is not simply a 
capacity stored within the state, from where it extends out into 
society. The apparent boundary of the state does not mark the limit 
of the processes of regulation. It is itself a product of those 
processes. 
The approach to the state advocated here does not imply an image 
of the state and private organizations as a single, totalized 
structure of power. On the contrary, there are always conflicts 
between them, as there are between different government agencies, 
between corporate organizations, and within each of them. It means 
we should not be misled into taking for granted the idea of the 
state as a coherent object clearly separate from "societyn--any more 
than we should be misled by the vagueness and complexity of these 
.phenomena into rejecting the concept of the state altogether. 
Conceived in this way, the state is no longer to be taken as 
essentially an actor, with the coherence, agency and autonomy this 
term presumes. The multiple arrangements that produce the apparent 
separateness of the state create effects of agency and partial 
autonomy, with concrete consequences. Yet such agency will always be 
contingent upon the production of difference--upon those practices 
that create the apparent boundary between state and society. These 
arrangements may be so effective, however, as to make things appear 
the reverse of this. The state comes to seem an autonomous starting 
point, as an actor that intervenes in society. Statist approaches to 
political analysis take this reversal for reality. 
What is proposed here, instead, is an approach to the state that 
refuses to take for granted this dualism, yet can account for why 
social and political reality appears in this binary form. It is not 
sufficient simply to criticize the abstract, idealist appearance the 
state assumes in the neo-institutionalist literature. Gabriel 
Almond, for example, complains that the concept of the state. 
employed in much of the new literature I1seems to have metaphysical 
overtonesm (Almond 1987, 476) and David Easton argues that the state 
is presented.by one writer as an Itundefinable essence, a 'ghost in 
the machine,' knowable only through its variable manifestations" 
(1981, 316). Such criticisms ignore the fact that this is how the 
state very often appears in practice. The task of a critique of the 
state is not just to reject such metaphysics, but to explain how it 
has been possible to produce this practical effect, so 
characteristic of the modern political order. What is it about 
modern society, as a particular form of social and economic order, 
that has made possible the apparent autonomy of the state as a free- 
standing entity? Why is this kind of apparatus, with its typical 
basis in an abstract system of law and its almost transcendental 
association with the "nationn as the fundamental political 
community, the distinctive political arrangement of the modern age? 
What particular practices and techniques have continually reproduced 
the ghost-like abstraction of the state, so that despite the effort 
to have the term "polished off a quarter of a century ago," as 
Easton (1981, 303) puts it, it has returned "to haunt us once 
againf1? 
Neo-institutionalist theorists of the state have ignored these 
historical questions. Even theorists who adopt an historical 
perspective, such as Skocpol, are unable to offer an historical 
explanation of the appearance of the modern state. Committed to an 
approach in which the state is an independent cause, Skocpol cannot 
explain the ability of the state to appear as an entity standing 
apart from society in terms of factors external to the state. The 
state must be an independent cause of events, even when those 
events, as in a case such as revolutionary France, involve the very 
birth of a modern, apparently autonomous state. 
The Appearance of Structure 
To illustrate the kind of explanation that might be possible, one 
can return to Skocpol's account of the French case. As we have 
already seen, pre-revolutionary France is described by Skocpol as a 
society, meaning a society in which the power and 
privileges of a landed nobility and the power of the central 
administration were inextricably bound together. We can now describe 
this situation another way, as a society in which those modern 
techniques that make the state appear to be a separate entity that 
somehow stands outside society had not yet been institutionalized. 
The revolutionary period represents the consolidation of such novel 
techniques. Skocpol characterizes the revolutionary transformation 
of the French state as principally a transformation in the army and 
the bureaucracy, both of which became permanent, professional 
organizations whose staffs were for the first time set apart from 
other commercial and social activities and whose size and 
effectiveness were vastly extended. For Skocpol, such changes are to 
be understood as the consequence of an autonomous state, whose 
officials desired to embark on the expansion and consolidation of 
centralized power. We are therefore given little detail about the 
techniques on which such revolutionary transformations rested. 
How was it now possible to assemble a permanent army of up to 
three-quarters of a million men, transform an entire economy into 
production for war, maintain authority and discipline on such a 
scale, and so "separateww this military machine from society that the 
traditional problem of desertion was overcome? By what parallel 
means were the corruptions and leakages of financial administration 
brought under control? What was the nature of the lwmechanical 
efficiency and articulationtww in a phrase quoted from J.F. Bosher 
(Skocpol 1979, 200), that in every realm would now enable ##the 
virtues of organization to offset the vices of individual menw? 
What kind of lwarticulation,wl in other words, could now seem to 
separate mechanically an "organizationn from the "individual menm 
who composed it? Rather than attributing such transformations to 
policies of an autonomous state, it would be more accurate to trace 
in these new techniques of organization and articulation the very 
possibility of appearing to set apart from society the free-standing 








An exploration of such questions would have to begin by 
acknowledging the enormous significance of those small-scale, 
polymorphous methods of order that Foucault calls disciplines. The 
new bureaucratic and military strength of the French state was 
founded on powers generated out of the meticulous organization of 
space, movement, sequence and position. The new power of the army, 
for example, was based on such measures as the construction of 
barracks as sites of permanent confinement set apart from the social 
world, the introduction of daily inspection and drill, repetitive 
training in maneuvers broken down into precisely timed sequences and 
combinations, and the elaboration of complex hierarchies of command, 
spatial arrangement and surveillance. With such techniques an army 
could be made into what a contemporary military manual called an 
"artificial machine," and other armies now seemed like collections 
of "idle and inactive menm (cited Fuller 1955, 2:196). 
Disciplinary power has two consequences for understanding the 
modern state--only the first of which is analyzed by Foucault. In 
the first place, one can move beyond the image of power as 
essentially a system of sovereign commands or policies backed by 
force. This approach is adopted by all the neo-institutional 
theorists of the state. It conceives of state power in the form of a 
person (an individual or collective decision-maker), whose decisions 
form a system of orders and prohibitions that direct and constrain 
. social action. Power is thought of as an exterior constraint: its 
source is a sovereign authority above and outside society, and it 
operates by setting external limits to behavior, establishing 
negative prohibitions and laying down channels of proper conduct. 
Discipline, by contrast, works not from the outside but from 
within, not at the level of an entire society but at the level of 
detail, and not by constraining individuals and their actions but by 
producing them. As Foucault puts it, a negative, exterior power 
gives way to an internal, productive power. Disciplines work 
locally, entering social processes, breaking them down into separate 
functions, rearranging the parts, increasing their efficiency and 
precision, and reassembling them into more productive and powerful 
combinations. These methods produce the organized power of armies, 
schools, bureaucracies, factories, and other distinctive 
institutions of the technical age. They also produce, within such 
institutions, the modern individual, constructed as an isolated, 
disciplined, receptive and industrious political subject. Power 
relations do not simply confront this individual as a set of 
external orders and prohibitions. His or her very individuality, 
formed within such institutions, is already the product of those 
relations. 
The second consequence of modern discipline is one that Foucault 
does not explain. Despite their localized and polyvalent nature, 
disciplinary powers are somehow consolidated into the modern, 
territorially-based, institutionally structured order of the modern 
state. Foucault does not dismiss the importance of this larger kind 
of structure; he simply does not believe that the understanding of 
power should begin there: "One must rather conduct an ascendinq 
analysis of power, starting, that is, from its infinitesimal 
mechanisms... and then see how these mechanisms of power have been-- 
and continue to be--invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, 
transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by ever more general 
mechanisms ..., [how they] came to be colonised and maintained by 
global mechanisms and the entire state systemw (Foucault 1980b 
99-101). Yet Foucault does not explain how it is that disciplinary 
powers do come to be utilized, stabilized and reproduced in state 
structures or other lageneralized rne~hanisms.~~ 
An obvious example of the relationship between infinitesimal and 
general mechanisms can be found in law, where the micro-powers of 
disciplinary normalization are structured into the larger apparatus 
of the legal code and the juridical system. In discussing this case, 
Foucault falls back on the notion that the general structure is an 
ideological screen (that of sovereignty and right) superimposed upon 
the real power of discipline. ll[O]nce it became necessary for 
disciplinary constraints to be exercised through mechanisms of 
domination and yet at the same time for their effective exercise of 
power to be disguised, a theory of sovereignty was required to make 
an appearance at the level of the legal apparatus, and to reemerge 
in its codesw (1980b, 106). The organization of law at the general 
level "allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the 
mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual 
procedurest1 (105). Foucault steps away again from the implication 
that the general level is related to the micro-level as a public 
realm of ideology opposed to the hidden realm of actual power, by 
recalling that disciplines, too, contain a public discourse. But he 
provides no alternative terms in which to conceive of the way in 
which local mechanisms of power are related to the larger structural 
forms such as law in which they become institutionalized and 
reproduced. 
The .relationship between disciplinary methods and their 
stabilization in such forms as the state, I would argue, lies in the 
fact that at the same time as power relations become internal, in 
Foucault's terms, and by the same methods, they now take on the 
specific appearance of external llstructures.w The distinctiveness of 
the modern state, appearing as an apparatus that stands apart from 
the rest of the social world, is to be found in this novel 
structural effect. The effect is the counterpart of the production 
of modern individuality. For example, the new military methods of 
the late eighteenth century produced the disciplined individual 
soldier and, simultaneously, the novel effect of an armed unit as an 
"artificial machine." This military apparatus appeared somehow 
greater than the sum of its parts, as though it were a structure 
with an existence independent of the men who composed it. In 
comparison to other armies, which now looked like amorphous 
gatherings of "idle and inactive men,I1 the new army seemed something 
two-dimensional. It appeared to consist on the one hand of 
individual soldiers, and on the other of the "rnachinel1 they 
inhabited. Of course this apparatus has no independent existence. It 
is an effect produced by the organized partitioning of space, the 
regular distribution of bodies, exact timing, the coordination of 
movement, the combining of elements, and endless repetition, all of 
which are particular practices. There was nothing in the new power 
of the army except this distributing, arranging, and moving. But the 
order and precision of such processes created the effect of an 
apparatus apart from the men themselves, whose nstructure" orders, 
contains and controls them. 
A similar two-dimensional effect can be seen at work in other 
institutions of the modern state. The precise specification of space 
and function that characterize modern institutions, the coordination 
of these functions into hierarchical arrangements, the organization 
of supervision and surveillance, the marking out of time into 
schedules and programs, all contribute to constructing a world that 
appears to consist not of a complex of social practices but of a 
binary order: on the one hand individuals and their activities, on 
the other an inert nstructurew that somehow stands apart from 
individuals, precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to 
their lives. Indeed the very notion of an institution, as an 
abstract framework separate from the particular practices it 
enframes, can be seen as the product of these techniques. Such 
techniques have given rise to the peculiar, apparently binary world 
we inhabit, where reality seems to take the two-dimensional form of 
, . individual versus apparatus, practice versus institution, social 
life and its structure--or society versus state (cf. Mitchell 1988, 
1990). 
The state needs to be analyzed as such a structural effect. That 
is to say, it should be examined not as an actual structure, but as 
. the powerful, meta-physical effect of practices that make such 
structures appear to exist. In fact the nation-state is arguably the 
paramount structural effect of the modern technical era. It includes 
within itself many of the particular institutions already discussed, 
such as armies, schools and bureaucracies. Beyond these, the larger 
presence of the state in several ways takes the form of a framework 
that appears to stand apart from the social world.and provide an 
external structure. One characteristic of the modern state, for 
example, is the frontier. By establishing a territorial boundary and 
exercising absolute control over movement across it, state practices 
define and help constitute a national entity. Setting up and 
policing a frontier involves a variety of fairly modern social 
practices--continuous barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration 
laws, inspections, currency control and so on. These mundane 
arrangements, most of them unknown two hundred or even one hundred 
years ago, help manufacture an almost transcendental entity, the 
nation-state. This entity comes to seem something much more than the 
sum of the everyday activities that constitute it, appearing as a 
structure containing and giving order and meaning to people's lives. 
An analogous example is the law. Once again, one could analyze how 
the mundane details of the legal process, all of which are 
particular social practices, are so arranged as to produce the. 
effect that "laww exists as a sort of abstract, formal framework, 
superimposed above social practice. What we call the state, and 
think of as an intrinsic object existing apart from society, is the 
sum of these structural effects. 
To approach the state as set of structural effects is very 
different from a structural approach to the state. Structuralism 
takes for granted the idea of structure--a framework that somehow 
stands apart from material reality as its dimension of order--and 
does not ask how this apparently meta-physical separation is brought 
about. By approaching the state as an effect, one can both 
acknowledge the power of the political arrangements that we call the 
state and at the same time account for their elusiveness. One can 
examine how it is that the state seems to stand apart from society 
and yet see this distinction as an internal arrangement. The 
boundary of the state is merely the effect of such arrangements and 
does not mark a real edge. It is not the border of an actual object. 
To conclude this critique of approaches to the state, the 
argument for a different approach can be summarized in a list of 
five propositions: 
1. The state should not be taken as a free-standing entity, 
whether an agent, instrument, organization or structure, located 
apart from and opposed to another entity called society. 
2. The distinction between state and society should nevertheless 
be taken seriously, as the defining characteristic of the modern 
political order. The state cannot be dismissed as an abstraction or 
ideological construct and passed over in favor more real, material 
realities. In fact this distinction between conceptual and material, 
between abstract and real, needs placing in historical question, if 
we are to grasp how the modern state has appeared. 
3. For the same reason, the prevailing neo-institutionalist view 
of the state as essentially a phenomenon of decision-making or 
policy is inadequate. Its focus on one disembodied aspect of the 
state phenomenon assimilates the state/society distinction to the 
same problematic opposition between conceptual and material. 
4. The state should be addressed as an effect of mundane 
processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional 
specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the 
appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society. 
The essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of 
this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the 
producing and reproducing of this line of difference. 
5. These processes create the effect of the state not only as an 
entity set apart from society, but as a distinct dimension of 
structure, framework, codification, planning and intentionality. The 
state appears as an abstraction in relation to the concreteness of 
the social, and as a subjective ideality in relation to the 
objectness of the material world. The distinctions between abstract 
and concrete, ideal and material, and subjective and objective, 
which most political theorizing is built upon, are themselves partly 
constructed in those mundane social processes we recognize and name 
as the state. 
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